Bert-Jaap Koops homepage - research - Ph.D. thesis
To address this controversy, I organize a three-day conference on the Dutch crypto policy, which
is to answer the question: "How can and should the Dutch government address the problem that
the use of strong cryptography by criminals poses to law enforcement, taking into account the
legitimate interests to use cryptography in the information society?" Attending the conference are
representatives of the relevant groups of Dutch society that have an interest in a just crypto
policy: Alice, an average crypto user, Bob, a business crypto user, Polly, a law-enforcement
official, and Suzie, a suspect (who worries about a draconian crypto policy infringing her rights
of the defense). They will have to decide upon a crypto policy that reconciles the interests of
privacy and information security with the interest of law enforcement.
One of the key technologies for establishing information security is cryptography, systems which use mathematical algorithms and digital keys to encipher data in such a way that only authorized people can decrypt and read them. Especially public-key or asymmetric cryptography, which was developed in the 1970s, has opened up a vast array of applications for wide-scale encryption. (In public-key cryptography, users have a key pair consisting of a private and a public key. By widely distributing the public key which does not require a secure channel people can safely communicate with any number of others.) Crypto-graphy is employed to protect, e.g., telecommunications, personal data, electronic payment systems, intellectual-property rights, sensitive government and business data, and human rights. Also, cryptography can prevent crime, like computer crime and economic espionage.
A drawback of cryptography, however, is that criminals can use it to escape the notice of wiretapping and computer-searching police officers. Uncrackable crypto systems are easily available, and if criminals use them correctly (that is, if they are careful with their passphrases), they can communicate securely and store incriminating information safely without risk that the police be any the wiser. Therefore, cryptography will hamper the investigation of crime, in particular of organized crime, business crime, and computer crime. Today, the problem is not large: in the few cases that police have encountered encryption, they could generally crack it or find enough other evidence to make a winning case. However, the general expectation is that cryptocriminal use will rise significantly as cryptography is becoming ever more widely available and more user-friendly, particularly once it is built-in in the information and communications infrastructure. Since wiretapping and searching computers are important investigation measures (law-enforcement officials call wiretapping a crucial investigation technique, even if the efficacy of tapping is sometimes disputed), the threat of cryptocriminals to the rule of law is a real one. There is therefore a legitimate public interest in countering the (future) negative effect of crypto-graphy on law enforcement. In the Netherlands, this can best be addressed in the context of the general revision of investigation measures, which is taking place as a result of the finding in the mid-1990s that investigation practice had gotten out of hand ('IRT-gate').
The problem of cryptocriminals is being studied in many countries. Some states have enacted
legislation (France and Russia, for instance, have virtually prohibited strong cryptography, and
the Netherlands has introduced a provision that requires people to decrypt, which may soon be
extended to demand decryption by suspects as well), and some states (notably the UK and the
US) have expressed a serious desire to restrict the application of cryptography to systems which
leak information to law-enforcement. Most countries, however, are at a loss. The OECD have
issued 'guidelines' for a crypto policy which in fact do not guide at all, and states seem to be
waiting for each other to see what the emerging international direction will be. This much for the
background paper, which ends on a rather desperate note: "there is a general impasse in the
crypto controversy debate."
The first agenda item is choosing a least advantaged group, that is, the group which has most to lose in the crypto debate, where losses are counted in terms of fundamental freedoms and not in terms of material wealth. After all, the central tenet in law is to protect the weak from the strong: "law cannot be impartial in its function of regulating order: it will have to take sides with the powerless, with those placed under custody, with those who are most threatened to be overpowered." [Peters] If there is no option which is in all respects preferable to the others, the perspective of the least advantaged group is a good device to make a decision that does justice to this central tenet. The conferees agree that, in the Dutch context, Alice represents the least-advantaged group: her privacy, including her right to confidential communications, is at stake. Alice has more to lose than Polly, who even if wiretaps would become useless still has various investigation measures to catch criminals, while Suzie's rights are sufficiently protected by the right to a fair trial as interpreted by the European Court (being a Dutch conference, it has to respect the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights). And for businessman Bob, no fundamental freedoms are at stake. Therefore, the issue will be decided from the perspective of Alice, and so, the outcome must be the one which is most acceptable to the law-abiding crypto user.
Next, the conferees choose a set of principles, with which they can assess the options to address the crypto problem. They perceive four fundamental rights as essential to the crypto problem:
Besides, the conferees will also take into account the less fundamental, but still desirable
principles of workability, international compatibility, and technological sustainability. Since the
principles will conflict, the conferees also define an adjudication rule: a fundamental right can
only be infringed for the sake of another fundamental right, and not for the sake of a desirable
principle. And to decide which fundamental right carries most weight, the conferees agree that, if
all else is equal, a principle higher on the list will be accorded more weight.
These first two options are in fact the only options which ensure that the police can access crypto keys and decipher the encrypted data they gathered. If it should turn out that both these options are infeasible or undesirable, the police will have to do something else.
The second day, Polly, Suzie, Bob, and Alice discuss the merits and flaws of the options. Stimulating the development of non-confidentiality crypto does not make the problem worse for the police, but it does nothing to address cryptocriminals either. Therefore, they do not consider it an option after all. Next, reviewing LEAK cryptography (that is, key-escrow and key-recovery systems which give Law Enforcement Access to Keys to decrypt), the conferees note that the technology is yet in its infancy and that it involves intrinsic security risks. More importantly, it is not effective to catch cryptocriminals, since (smarter) criminals will not use systems which they know LEAK to the police. It is true that the police can profit from voluntary data recovery by businesses, but the development of data recovery should be left to the market.
Now, the conferees analyze under what conditions a decryption command can be given to suspects, given the privilege against self-incrimination as interpreted by the European Court in the Funke and Saunderscases. (A decryption command can easily be given to non-suspects and generally also to corporate crypto users, Bob happily notes, so that a decryption command can at any rate be given in several cases.) The privilege is not absolute, and given the Saunders finding that material which exists outside the will of the suspect may be demanded, the police can demand diskettes with private crypto keys to be handed over. Whether the police can also force a suspect to give the passphrase which normally protects the key is more contentious. If the police is pretty sure that the suspect is able to decrypt (in US case-law terminology: if it is a foregone conclusion that someone is able to decrypt), a decryption command is legally acceptable. The tricky issue is, however, how to enforce a decryption command: the general punishment for a refusal to cooperate with a legal order is three months, and this can not be enough to incite serious criminals to decrypt (with which they would risk many years' imprisonment). Penalizing crypto use 'in furtherance of a crime' is not an option, since it does not ease the proof issues it is supposed to alleviate. The two main enforcement options are therefore penalizing a decryption refusal with a substantial punishment (say, a few years), or reverse the burden of proof in order to allow the decryption refusal to be used as evidence in the primary case ("if you don't want to decrypt this, we assume it contains incriminating information"). Since the first option catches criminals the wrong way (one wants offenders to be punished for the offense they committed, not for 'cryptography abuse'), and since the second option is better targeted at serious criminals, reversing the burden of proof would be better to enforce a decryption command. However, if the fundamental presumption of innocence is to be respected, strict conditions must apply (consistent with the conditions the European Court defined in Murray), and the command will not be effective in many cases.
A general despondency now descends over the conference: perhaps there is no feasible way to ensure that the police can access crypto keys and decipher encrypted data they suspect to be incriminating. However, Suzie, Bob, Alice, and Polly realize with some relief that the police has other investigation powers to gather data, particularly since in the post-IRT-gate era, new investigation measures are being considered. The Dutch draft law on special investigation powers proposes 'direct eavesdropping': directional microphones and bugs which catch conversations (and, who knows, keyboard strokes) the moment they are spoken (or typed), before they can be encrypted. This power could be significantly extended to address the crypto problem, in particular by allowing the police to eavesdrop directly within homes. Another alternative investigation measure is intercepting electromagnetic radiation (TEMPEST monitoring), which can reproduce the contents of computer screens from an adjacent building or vehicle. Then again, there are other ways to gather information about, in particular, organized crime: one can infiltrate a criminal organization, or one can have an accomplice testify in court as a crown witness in return for a sentence reduction. The conferees realize that these legal measures, contrary to the technical measures of eaves-dropping and TEMPEST monitoring, are far removed from wiretapping and computer searches, because this yields different kinds of information. Moreover, all measures seriously infringe fundamental rights: the first two are major threats to privacy, and the last two threaten the rule of law. None of these measures, then, is an obvious solution to redress the gap in information-gathering caused by cryptocriminals. All the conferees can say at this moment, is that direct eavesdropping is more practicable than TEMPEST monitoring and that infiltration is to be preferred to crown witnesses (which is more detrimental to the rule of law).
Perhaps, then, Suzie sighs, we should do nothing at all. If the negative consequences of the
options are all larger than the positive ones, perhaps that would be the best option. The one
drawback of this is, of course, that it gives cryptocriminals free play. The conferees end the
second day in some confusion. They have identified which options are viable to address the
crypto problem: demand suspects to decrypt and reverse the burden of proof if they refuse, step
up 'direct eavesdropping' and infiltration, or decide to do nothing but they realize that not one
option is really satisfying.
Taking everything into account, the conferees choose the zero option. They thus conclude that for
the moment, the Dutch government should endorse the zero option as the one which best
reconciles the conflicting crypto interests.
To end the conference, the participants look back and evaluate what they have done. Having defined principles and adjudication rules, surveyed possible options, and narrowed down the list to viable options, the conferees had to decide the core problem. Using the perspective of Alice as the least advantaged group, they found that for the time being, the zero option is preferable. Policy makers should, however, continue to closely monitor devel-opments, in order to periodically review and if necessary to adjust this decision. Depending on the crime rate and the crypto use by criminals, and depending on the investigation powers the police can use, this could lead to allowing more alternative investigation measures to counter the possibly decreasing efficacy of wiretaps and computer searches.
© Bert-Jaap Koops, 1998. All rights reserved.
Last updated on 18 December 1998.